To provide a neurophysiological basis for the opponent nature of color vision it has been previously argued that a color cannot be both red and green because coloropponent neurons cannot respond to both red and green at the same time. The present analysis shows that such arguments hinge on the possibility of excluding statements of the kind ''a color can be both red and green.'' For an empirical fact to exclude such statements, these statements would have to be meaningful. However, statements like ''a color is both red and green'' are not meaningful and are not allowed in our language. Thus, the properties of neurons are not in a position to exclude the possibility of ''a color that is both red and green.'' This means that this attempt to establish a neurophysiological basis for opponent colors is flawed. © 1998 Aca-
The present note was inspired by the following remark by Ludwig Wittgenstein:
If I could describe the point of grammatical conventions by saying they are made necessary by certain properties of the colours (say), then that would make the conventions superfluous, since in that case I would be able to say precisely that which the conventions exclude my saying. Conversely, if the conventions were necessary, i.e., if certain combinations of words had to be excluded as nonsensical, then for that very reason I cannot cite a property of colours that makes the conventions necessary, since it would then be conceivable that the colours should not have this property, and I could only express that by violating the conventions. (Wittgenstein, 1975, p. 53) Early in the 19th century Young (1802) proposed that the human visual system contains three color mechanisms. This theory was later supported by Helmholtz (1852 Helmholtz ( , 1924 Helmholtz ( /1925 and became known as the Young-Helmholtz
